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Bombay HC: A Letter to the Jail Is Not Court, and Eight Mephedrone Accused Get Bail

The Bombay High Court held that informing a jailed accused about a request to extend the 180 day investigation period under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, and letting them file a written reply, is not the same as bringing them before the court.

The jail officer, called the Jail Superintendent, passed on the information to the accused.

A single judge bench of Justice Milind Jadhav, in its October 5 order, granted statutory bail to eight men. They were booked in a case involving the recovery of over 1.837 kilograms of mephedrone.

 The Court said the accused must be produced before the court, either in person or by video conferencing, when the application for extra investigation time is considered. This is a necessary safeguard.

Background:

The case involved the seizure of over 1.837 kilograms of mephedrone. On July 29, 2024, the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) applied to extend the 180 day deadline for completing its investigation. On August 13, 2024, the Public Prosecutor submitted the report that the NDPS law requires. On August 14, 2024, the Special Court allowed the extension.

On July 31, 2024, the Special Court sent a letter to the Jail Superintendent of Yerawada Central Prison. The letter directed that the accused be told about the Investigating Officer’s application and be given copies so they could file a reply. The accused allegedly refused to accept the copies.

The chargesheet was finally filed on February 5, 2025. The accused asked for default bail. Their argument was that they were not produced before the Sessions Court, either in person or by video conferencing, when the extension application was considered and decided.

Extension Is Not a Matter of Right:

Justice Jadhav explained that the prosecution has no right to extra investigation time beyond 180 days. The Special Court can extend the period only if it is satisfied by the Public Prosecutor’s report.

That report must show how the investigation is progressing and give specific reasons for keeping the accused in custody beyond 180 days.

Justice Jadhav said an extension order directly affects the personal liberty of the accused, so the legal requirements must be followed strictly:

“The order of extension therefore is not a mere administrative continuation of the original period. It is an order which directly affects the personal liberty of the accused and permits the prosecution to continue the investigation and detention of the accused beyond the period fixed by the legislature. The statutory requirements governing such extension must therefore be strictly complied with. In the present case the filing of the Application for extension before expiry of the initial period of 180 days is not by itself sufficient to answer the question which arises for consideration,”

 Accused Must Be Produced:

On the need to produce the accused, Justice Jadhav said the August 14, 2024 order, as shown to the High Court, did not record that the applicants were produced before the Trial Court, in person or by video conferencing, when the extension application was considered.

 The Court said it is not enough that lawyers appeared for some of the accused, or that some accused gave their say. That alone does not prove the law was followed.

Justice Jadhav held:

“However with regard to the crucial requirement of production of the Applicants the order dated August 14, 2024 as presently placed before this Court does not record that Applicants were produced before the Trial Court either physically or through Video Conferencing when the extension application was considered. The fact that Advocates appeared for some accused persons or that certain accused persons submitted their say cannot by itself establish compliance with the law. A communication addressed to the Jail Superintendent and an opportunity to submit a written reply cannot automatically be equated with production of the accused before the Court. This Court is of the view that production of the accused before the Court at the stage of consideration of the application for extension is a necessary safeguard. The requirement is not an empty formality. The order of extension directly affects the personal liberty of the accused because it permits the prosecution to continue investigation and the accused to remain in custody beyond the period ordinarily prescribed by law. The Court while exercising such power must therefore ensure compliance with the procedure recognised by the Supreme Court,”

 Later Chargesheet Is No Cure:

The NCB argued that it filed a chargesheet just before the extended 180 day period ended. The Court did not accept this. It said a chargesheet filed later cannot by itself fix a defect in the very order the prosecution relies on to lengthen the legal time limit.

The judge said:

“The prosecution cannot derive an advantage from an extension order without first demonstrating that the order was validly passed in accordance with the statutory conditions and the binding principles governing such extension,”

Seriousness Cannot Override Bail:

The Court noted that the allegations are serious and that the prosecution’s concerns about the effect on society cannot be ignored.

The judge said that for regular bail under the NDPS Act, things like how much contraband was found and the limits in Section 37 are important. But they cannot be allowed to take away a legal right to bail when the conditions for that right have been met.

Justice Jadhav said he knew the prosecution had relied on how big the alleged offence was and how much contraband was involved. These points may matter a great deal when a regular bail application is heard on its merits. But they cannot decide whether the time limit for completing the investigation was validly extended. He said:

“However the present Applications are not applications for regular bail on merits. Applicants invoke a statutory right to default bail. In a case of default bail the principal consideration is different. The Court is required to determine whether the prosecution has completed the investigation within the period prescribed by law or has obtained a legally valid extension of that period. The seriousness of the offence cannot by itself enlarge the period which the legislature has prescribed for completion of investigation,”

Final Directions:

Justice Jadhav held that the right to statutory bail arises when the prosecution fails to meet the time limit set by law. He also held that the Trial Court’s August 14, 2024 extension could not be used against the applicants. The judge ordered:

“The right to statutory/default bail arises from the failure of the prosecution to comply with the time limit prescribed by law. The seriousness of the allegations cannot be used to cure noncompliance with the procedure governing extension of that period. In view of the observations and findings this Court is satisfied that Applicants have made out a case for grant of statutory/default bail. The extension granted by the Trial Court by order dated August 14, 2024 cannot be relied upon against Applicants for the purpose of defeating their statutory right in view of the failure to establish compliance with the requirement of keeping the concerned accused present before the Court at the stage of consideration of the application for extension,”

The Court allowed the applications and granted statutory/default bail to all eight applicants on a surety of ₹1,00,000 each.

Case Details: Bhimaji Parshuram Sabale vs Union of  (Bail Application 5481 of 2024)

 

Closure Report Filed One Day Before Hearing: Bombay HC Says IO Prima Facie “Dishonestly” Favoured Accused

A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court comprising Justice A. S. Gadkari and Justice Kamal Khata observed that the Investigating Officer, prima facie, exceeded his jurisdiction  to help the accused and tried  to overreach the Court.

The case began with a petition asking for the investigation into a crime registered at Chembur Police Station, Mumbai, to be transferred. The petitioner was unhappy with how the investigation was being done and how slowly it was moving.

The Court recorded, “This is yet another case wherein the Investigating Officer (Mr. Anand Shahane) has exceeded his jurisdiction, prima facie with a view to help the accused person and has sought to overreach this Court.”

Background

The petition was filed on 30 June 2026. The informant and petitioner wanted the investigation transferred because they were not happy with its slow pace and manner. The petitioner’s case was that the investigation was being done in a most lackadaisical manner only to benefit the accused.

The Court recorded that the investigation began on 2 April 2026 but was still not complete even by 1 September 2026. The Investigating Officer then filed a ‘C-Summary Report’ on 15 September 2026.

This was one day before the petition was to be heard on 16 September 2026, and after the Court had expressed its mind on 1 September 2026.

The allegations

The case is about the caste certificate of Respondent No. 6. The Court recorded that his caste validity certificate, which declared him a Hindu (Mahar), had been declared invalid by the Caste Scrutiny Committee.

The Supreme Court upheld that order declaring the certificate invalid. It was alleged that, on the same and/or similar facts, Respondent No. 6 then got a caste certificate saying he was a Buddhist (Mahar).

The FIR contained serious allegations under Sections 406, 420, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

How the C-Summary Report was filed:

The Court then looked at the circumstances around the filing of the C-Summary Report. On 1 September 2026, the learned A.P.P. asked for time to take instructions from Respondent No. 4, and the matter was adjourned to 16 September 2026.

The Court noted that the investigation had started on 2 April 2026 but was not complete even by 1 September 2026. After the Court expressed its mind on 1 September 2026, the Investigating Officer acted quickly and filed the C-Summary Report on 15 September 2026, just a day before the hearing on 16 September 2026.

The Investigating Officer was present in Court on 1 September 2026 and knew the matter had been adjourned to 16 September 2026.

The Court further recorded that on 1 September 2026, the Investigating Officer did not tell the Court that the investigation was practically complete or that he was about to file a Summary Report.

Even on 16 September 2026, the filing of the C-Summary Report was not brought to the Court’s notice. So, no reference to the filing was made in the order dated 16 September 2026.

What the Court found in the report:

The C-Summary Report was filed under Rule 219 of Chapter V of the Bombay Police Manual, 1959, and ran to more than 500 pages. After reading it, the Court recorded that the Investigating Officer seemed to have simply repeated the findings of the Caste Scrutiny Committee in his conclusions.

The Court recorded that he had not done any effective investigation into the informant’s allegations about getting monetary benefits and other relevant matters.

The Court further observed, “A further perusal of record prima facie indicates that, the Investigating Officer in fact has not carried out any investigation and has deliberately taken all steps to protect the interest of Respondent No.6. This is wholly unconscionable.”

The State’s explanation:

The learned A.P.P. said the filing of the C-Summary Report may have been brought to the Court’s notice on 16 September 2026 because the then A.P.P. had written a letter to the Joint Commissioner of Police about transferring the investigation.

The A.P.P. also said that on 8 September 2026, on the orders of the Joint Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, the investigation was transferred from P.I. Anand Shahane to the In-charge Police Inspector, Unit 6, Crime Branch, Mumbai.

The Senior Police Inspector of Chembur Police Station was told to send all documents to the newly appointed Investigating Officer.

The Court then recorded that, after the investigation was taken away from P.I. Anand Shahane, he immediately filed an application before the jurisdictional Magistrate asking for the return of the Summary papers.

He did this even without filing an application to withdraw the Summary Report before the Magistrate. The Court did not accept the State’s explanation.

Judicial record cannot be disputed:

On the question of what happened before the Court, the Bench relied on the Supreme Court decision in State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Another.

The Supreme Court’s observations quoted in the order said, “Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena.”

The judgment also said, “Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation.” The principle noted was that what a judgment says happened in Court cannot be challenged by statements made at the Bar, affidavits or other evidence.

The Court further recorded that if a party believes something was  recorded wrongly  in a judgment, the right step is to point out the mistake to the same judges who wrote the record, while the matter is still fresh in their minds.

The order records the Supreme Court’s conclusion that “If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there.”

The application for withdrawal:

The learned A.P.P. also said that P.I. Anand Shahane had filed an application on 18 September 2026 before the jurisdictional Magistrate, asking to withdraw the papers of the C-Summary Report, but that the application had not been processed.

The Court recorded that this was yet another step taken by the Investigating Officer to favour Respondent No. 6 and overreach the Court.

The Bench observed, “We fail to understand as to how the papers of ‘C-Summary Report’ can be withdrawn once those are taken on record by the Magistrate particularly without there being an Order permitting withdrawal of ‘C-Summary Report’ as contemplated under the law.”

Investigating Officer’s Conduct:

The Court then looked at the Investigating Officer’s conduct as a whole. The Bench recorded, “It prima facie appears to us that, the concerned Investigating Officer has dishonestly taken the aforesaid steps only with a view to favour Respondent No.6 and none else.”

The Court further recorded, “According to us, filing of such ‘C-Summary Report’ is an orchestrated attempt only to frustrate the Petitioner’s remedy and overreach the process before this Court and nothing else.”

The Court also asked how the C-Summary Report could have been filed when the FIR had specific allegations under Sections 466, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The Bench noted that the allegations in the FIR were clear and that the Caste Scrutiny Committee, the High Court and the Supreme Court had all passed orders about Respondent No. 6.

The Court recorded, “We are thus led to conclude that, prima facie, Mr. Anand Shahane, with a view to facilitate Respondent No.6, has filed the said ‘C-Summary Report’ before the concerned Magistrate and thereby frustrate the remedy available to the Petitioner.”

Directions:

Based on the facts and observations in the order, the Court directed that the matter be brought to the notice of the Commissioner of Police, Mumbai.

The Commissioner was told to file a detailed affidavit in reply to the petition, dealing specifically with each allegation and with the points recorded in the order.

The Court also told the Commissioner not to hand over the task of filing the affidavit to any junior officer, and to read the entire record before filing the reply.

The learned A.P.P. stated that the Commissioner of Police, Mumbai would file the affidavit in reply within three weeks. The Court accepted this statement and directed that the matter be listed on 21 October 2026.

Case Details: Chitra Salunke V/s. State of Maharashtra & Ors, WRIT PETITION NO. 3390 OF 2026

“He Will Die in That Cage”: Trial Judge Tells Child Survivor ; Delhi HC Refuses to Suspend Convict’s Life Sentence

The Delhi High Court has refused to suspend the sentence of a man convicted of sexually assaulting a young child. The bench was made up of Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Dinesh Bhatt. They said that, at this stage, they did not want to suspend the sentence, given the evidence on record, including the forensic evidence.

 The Court was hearing an appeal against the conviction and sentence given by the Additional Sessions Judge 01 (POCSO), North West, Rohini, Delhi.

The case:

The incident took place on 23rd July 2023, when the survivor was seven years old. The Trial Court found the man guilty of aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a child below 12 years of age, committed repeatedly, under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. He was also found guilty of criminal intimidation. After looking at the evidence, the Trial Court said the prosecution had proved the offences beyond all reasonable doubt.

The sentence:

For aggravated penetrative sexual assault, the Trial Court gave rigorous imprisonment for life. It said clearly that “life’’ means jail for the rest of his natural life. A fine of Rs. 1 lakh was also imposed, with one year of simple imprisonment if he did not pay. For criminal intimidation, he got five years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 20,000, with three months of simple imprisonment if he did not pay. Both sentences will run at the same time.

Compensation:

The Trial Court ordered that the full fine, if recovered, be paid to the child victim as compensation. It also looked at the nature of the crime, the depth of the child’s suffering and the lifelong impact of the offence when deciding how much compensation she should get.

Keeping in mind the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules, 2020 and the facts of the case, the Trial Court awarded Rs. 10.50 lakh to the child under Section 33(8) of the POCSO Act.

 The Trial Court observed, “Considering all the factors as enumerated above, as per Rule 9 of The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules, 2020 and the observations made in the case titled as X v. State of NCT of Delhi (acting through its Secretary) (supra) as well as after evaluating the nature of the crime, the depth of suffering, and the lifelong impact on the victim child, this Court in an attempt to heal and restore the victim child holds that the victim child is entitled to the maximum compensation permissible under law.”

Directions by the High Court:

The High Court noted the compensation awarded by the Trial Court. It told the Secretary of the District Legal Services Authority, North West, Delhi, to file a status report on the compensation awarded to the victim’s family. It also ordered that the compensation and a message written by the Trial Court Judge for the survivor be given to the child or her family within two weeks.

The Judge’s message to the child:

The order includes a post script written by the Trial Court Judge, Ms. Rajani Ranga, Additional Sessions Judge 01 (POCSO), North West, Rohini, speaking directly to the child. 

The Judge stated, “Before parting, this Court must address the child victim – not in the formal language of a judgment but as a judge who has heard her voice, who has read her words, and who has been moved by her courage.”

The Judge mentioned the child’s plea that the accused should stay in jail until he became old. She explained that the Court had considered this plea while deciding the sentence. The message stated, “Beta, this Court heard you. When you said Jab tak uncle buddhe na ho jaaye, tab tak unhe jail mein hi Rakha jaaye, this Court listened. And this Court has answered your plea.”

The Judge further told the child that the accused would stay in prison for the rest of his natural life and would not be able to harm her or any other child again.

 The message stated, “Beta, this Court heard you. When you said Jab tak uncle buddhe na ho jaaye, tab tak unhe jail mein hi Rakha jaaye, this Court listened. And this Court has answered your plea.“Today, this Court has ordered that the man you called ‘uncle’ will never walk free again. He will live in a cage for the rest of his life. He will grow old in that cage. He will die in that cage. He will never be able to hurt you, or your little sister, or any other child, ever again.”

The Trial Court also praised the child’s courage in coming to Court and identifying the accused. The Judge wrote, “You are the bravest little girl this Court has ever seen. You came to Court, you pointed at the man who hurt you, and you told the truth.”

 The Judge added that the Court could not give back her lost childhood, but her words had been heard and her plea had been granted.

The message ended with words of encouragement. The Judge told her, “Now, beta, live your life. Go to school Make friends. Laugh. Play Dream. This Court will always remember your courage.” 

The High Court noted that the child was seven years old at the time of the incident and is now ten. It described the Trial Court’s message as one of encouragement.

Other orders:

The High Court told the concerned Jail Superintendent to place the latest nominal roll and other relevant material about the appellant on record. It also told the appellant to file an affidavit about his past criminal record, as required by the applicable Practice Directions. The Registry was told to call for the Trial Court Record and prepare the appeal paperbook quickly.

Decision on suspension of sentence:

The appellant had applied for suspension of his sentence and release on bail while the appeal is pending. The High Court looked at the evidence available at this stage, including the forensic evidence.

 The Bench held, “Considering the evidence in this matter, including the forensic evidence, at this stage, the Court is not inclined to suspend the sentence.” So the sentence was not suspended and the appellant was not granted bail at this stage.

Next steps:

The matter will be listed again to consider the status report on the compensation awarded to the victim. The appeal is also fixed for further hearing. The High Court directed that copies of the order be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent and the District Legal Services Authority for information and compliance.

Case Details: Sumit Shakya v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr.



“If Citizens Are Excluded, What Will We Do With Your SIR?” Bombay HC At Goa Asks ECI

The Bombay High Court at Goa has questioned the Election Commission of India (ECI) over the manner in which voters who have changed their residential addresses are being treated during the ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls.

A Division Bench of Justices Valmiki Menezes and Amit Jamsandekar raised concerns about  the rejection of Form 8 applications submitted by voters seeking to update their addresses. The Court observed that these voters could be left with no real remedy if their names are removed from the draft electoral roll and they are then stopped from using Form 8 to update their details.

The Case:

The issue came up in a petition filed by Paresh Salgaonkar and members of his family. Their names were left out of the electoral roll during the SIR exercise, even though they had submitted Form 8 applications to change their address.

Court Questions Purpose of SIR:

The Bench asked what the main goal of the SIR exercise really is. It noted that the exercise was meant to find out whether the people on the electoral rolls are Indian citizens, and therefore have the right to stay on the rolls.

The Court said:

“Entire SIR procedure was on the basis that had to find out whether an elector is actually an Indian citizen or not. The basis of the SIR was not to see whether the voter is there or not. It is to find out whether he is an Indian citizen or not.’’

Keeping this in mind, the Court asked a question: if citizens are taken off the electoral roll during the revision, does that not defeat the whole purpose of  the SIR? 

The Bench asked the ECI:

“Read the judgment, it says ECI has an obligation to ensure that all Indian citizens are on the list… If citizens are excluded what will we do with your SIR? If citizens are being removed from the list then what is the purpose of this entire SIR process then?”

ECI’s Response:

Form 8 is used by an existing voter to ask for a correction of details or a change of address. However, the ECI told the Court that voters who had not submitted the required enumeration form during the SIR had to follow a different process if their names were missing from the draft roll.

Advocate Gauresh Agni, appearing for the ECI, said that the SIR guidelines require voters to submit the enumeration form along with Form 8 to get their address changed. If the enumeration form had not been submitted, the voter would have to use Form 6, which is meant for adding a name to the electoral roll.

The Court, however, asked whether the Supreme Court’s directions on SIR really required Form 6 to be used in place of the enumeration process.

The Bench observed:

“So, will this subserve the purpose by a Form 6 or a Form 8? Judgment [of the Supreme Court on Bihar SIR nowhere says that the manner of doing this is going to be by Form 6. Law is either by the legislature or if it is delegated, or a rule-making power.”

The Court also pointed to the ECI’s constitutional duty to make sure that eligible citizens are not denied their right to be represented on the electoral rolls.

It asked:

“If, by this process, citizens are excluded, then how do we read this mandate?”

Court Flags Impossible Situation For Voters:

The Bench asked how a person who has only moved to a new home could be made to submit Form 6, since that form requires a declaration that the person is not already registered elsewhere.

The Court pointed out that a voter who submits Form 8 is told the application cannot be processed without the enumeration form. But if the voter submits Form 6, they would have to make a declaration that does not correctly describe their situation.

The Bench observed:

“If a voter comes to you with Form 8, saying he has changed his address you just cannot tell that person that look your name isn’t included in the draft roll now you will have to fill in Form 6 (inclusion of new voter). Your enumeration form, basically has a declaration that a person continues to live in the address as mentioned in the existing voters list. But consider, if someone has changed their residence, can you compel the person to make a false declaration by submitting that pre-filled enumeration? Why can’t that person simply give a Form 8 because anyway, his name is there in the existing list he just wants to get his address changed.. Why compel enumeration form?”

Court Rejects Draft Roll Argument:

The ECI’s lawyer argued that under Section 25(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, the SIR involves preparing electoral rolls from scratch. This means the names of people who do not submit enumeration forms would not appear in the draft roll.

He also said that notices were displayed publicly because the ECI may not have updated the addresses of voters who had moved.

The Bench, however, did not accept this reasoning.

“Draft role will not come in picture until the SIR is complete. Here the SIR is not complete. You are in the process.” the court observed.

The bench will continue hearing the matter on October 6.

Case details: Paresh Salgaonkar & 5 Ors v. The State of Goa (WP No. 732 of 2026)

 

Justice Nitin Wasudeo Sambre Appointed Acting Chief Justice of Delhi High Court

Justice Nitin Wasudeo Sambre has been appointed as the Acting Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court following the elevation of the incumbent Chief Justice, Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, to the Supreme Court of India. Justice Sambre will assume the responsibilities of the office after Justice Upadhyaya relinquishes charge as Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court.

The appointment has been made under Article 223 of the Constitution of India, which provides for the appointment of an Acting Chief Justice when the office of the Chief Justice of a High Court is vacant or when the Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties of the office.

“In exercise of the power conferred by Article 223 of the Constitution of India, the President is pleased to appoint Shri Justice Nitin Wasudeo Sambre, Judge of the Delhi High Court, to perform the duties of office of the Chief Justice of that High Court with effect from the date Shri Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya relinquishes the charge of the office of Chief Justice consequent upon his elevation as a Judge of the Supreme Court of India,” the notification says.

The development follows the appointment of Justice Upadhyaya as a Judge of the Supreme Court. His swearing-in ceremony is scheduled to take place tomorrow, following which he will formally take charge as a Supreme Court Judge.

Justice Sambre will accordingly take over the administrative and judicial responsibilities of the Delhi High Court as its Acting Chief Justice once Justice Upadhyaya demits office as Chief Justice consequent to his elevation.

NSA Detention Was “Custody by Another Route” to Defeat Bail: SC Orders Release, Imposes ₹10 Lakh Costs

The Supreme Court held that authorities cannot pass an order of preventive detention by relying only on an extra-judicial confessional statement made to a police officer. A Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu set aside an Allahabad High Court judgment. That judgment had dismissed a habeas corpus petition challenging the detention of Mulla Afroz under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA).

The Court ordered that the appellant be released forthwith, unless his custody is required in connection with any other case. It also directed the State to pay costs of ₹10 lakh to the appellant within one month.

Background

On November 24, 2024, violence broke out during a survey of a mosque at Sambhal. Four people died.

The appellant was not named in the first FIR (Case Crime No. 333 of 2024). He was arrested 54 days later, on January 17, 2025. He was also taken into custody in connection with the other FIRs.

A confessional statement of the appellant is said to have been recorded during this custody. A 32 bore pistol was allegedly recovered because of it.

On September 9, 2025, the High Court granted him bail in Case Crime No. 340 of 2024.

He was still in judicial custody in the other cases when the District Magistrate, Sambhal, passed the detention order on October 13, 2025.

The State Government confirmed the order on November 28, 2025, for 12 months.

By June 2026, the appellant had bail in all the criminal cases against him.

On June 8, 2026, a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed his writ petition. It held that the detaining authority’s subjective satisfaction was justified.

Police Confession Alone Cannot Justify Detention:

The appellant had said all along that he made the confession under torture and threats of death. The State’s reply affidavit and written submissions did not deny this. The Court found that the statement could not be seen as voluntary.

Justice Datta, who wrote the judgment, held:

“The question which, thus, presents itself is, whether a statement, which the law treats as irrelevant for determining guilt, can nevertheless constitute a ground for forming the subjective satisfaction necessary to sustain an order of preventive detention. We think not!”

The Court then held:

“Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that a confessional statement made before a police officer cannot, by itself, and in the absence of any independent material lending support thereto, constitute a basis for forming the subjective satisfaction necessary to sustain an order of preventive detention. To permit such a course would be to allow a detention order to rest upon a foundation which the law itself regards with suspicion and excludes from evidentiary consideration.”

The Court also noted what happens when the authority relied on other material too:

“Law is, however, well settled that if the detaining authority has relied upon other materials apart from the confessional statement, the Court has to ascertain whether the detention can be upheld based on such other materials.”

Irrelevant Grounds Weaken Article 22(5):

The Court said Article 22(5) gives a detained person two rights:

  1. To be told the grounds of detention as soon as may be.
  2. To get the earliest opportunity to make a representation.

These rights can only be used meaningfully when the grounds are relevant, definite and capable of being answered effectively.

Justice Datta held:

“The inclusion of an irrelevant ground, no less than the inclusion of a vague or obscure ground, strikes at the heart of the protection guaranteed by Article 22(5). Ergo, a detenu cannot be expected to make an effective representation against allegations which, in the eyes of law, are incapable of sustaining the detention itself. Where the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is founded, wholly or in part, on material that is legally irrelevant, the constitutional safeguard stands impaired. An order of preventive detention resting upon such irrelevant allegations must, for that reason alone, be rendered unsustainable.”

Article 20(3), Section 23 BSA and Overruling of Suman

The Court held that this argument must be tested against two things: Article 20(3) of the Constitution, and Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA). Section 23 is similar to Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Justice Datta noted:

“A confession made before a police officer is presumed to be tainted and vulnerable to the influences of coercion, threat, inducement or promise. Section 23 of the BSA unequivocally embodies this principle by providing that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved against an accused. The provision recognises only two limited exceptions, namely, where the confession is made before a magistrate in accordance with law, or where it leads to the discovery of a fact, to the extent permitted by law. The legislative command is, therefore, clear: a confessional statement made before the police is not regarded as trustworthy evidence and is generally excluded from consideration against the maker thereof.”

The Court held that the remarks in Aruna Kumari v. Govt. of A.P. (1988) and Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N. (2006) about using confessions for detention were obiter dicta. That means they were side remarks, not the basis of the decision. In neither case had the detention been challenged on the ground that it rested on the detainee’s confession.

The Court overruled the Madras High Court Full Bench decision in Suman v. State of Tamil Nadu (1986), but only on its conclusion about using confessions to justify detention:

“We hold that the conclusion in respect of the question concerning the use of confessional statements in justifying detention orders rendered in Suman (supra) cannot be sustained, and are accordingly overruled to that extent.”

Material Not Supplied, the Chargesheet, and Bail

The Court then looked at the other material.

CCTV and video footage. The grounds cited this footage to identify the appellant as the “mastermind”. But it was not given to him, and it was not among the 22 documents relied upon. Justice Datta held:

“Reliance upon material which has neither been supplied nor disclosed cannot be sustained. Consequently, this circumstance cannot be regarded as furnishing a valid basis for the detention order.”

Mobile communications with a “Boss”. The grounds also record that the appellant had erased the data on his phone. Neither the phone nor the messages were part of the relied upon documents. The Court said it could not hold that these allegations were a valid or relevant ground.

The chargesheet. The Court held that filing a chargesheet is only the end of an investigation and the investigating agency’s opinion. It is not a finding of guilt, and it is not conclusive proof of involvement. The detaining authority also had not explained how a chargesheet, by itself, confirms the appellant’s participation or a disturbance of public order.

Information about jail discussions. Police officials said that, in jail, the appellant was allegedly planning large scale violence once he got bail. The Court held:

“What is evident therefrom is that the impugned detention is an attempt to frustrate the judicial order granting bail, and to keep the detenu in custody by another route. Such a detention is not preventive but punitive and appears intended to subvert the order granting bail.”

The Court further held that the State’s line between punitive and preventive powers had become blurred:

“In the facts of the present case, we find that the distinction sought to be maintained by the State between the punitive and preventive jurisdictions has, in substance, become blurred.”

Concluding on the detention order, Justice Datta held:

“We are unable to persuade ourselves to sustain the detention order as legal and valid. The requisite nexus between the material relied upon and the satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority is conspicuously absent.”

Final Order and ₹10 Lakh Costs:

The Court set aside the High Court judgment, the detention order and the confirmation order. It directed:

“Appellant shall be released forthwith, unless his custody is required in connection with any other case. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed on the aforesaid terms.”

The Court made clear that it gave no opinion on the pending criminal cases:

“We make it clear that we express no opinion whatsoever on the merits of the criminal case(s), which shall proceed in accordance with law uninfluenced by any observation contained in this judgment.”

The Court noted that the appellant had already lost a lot of liberty, even though he had been granted bail in all the cases. It observed:

“In such circumstances, the process was made the punishment.”

On costs, the Court directed:

“We consider it prudent to impose costs of Rs.10 lakh on the State for being made over to the appellant within a month from the date of this judgment.”

Case Title: Mulla Afroz v. Union of India and Ors. – Criminal Appeal No. 4310 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 12534 of 2026)

Three judges recuse, then new Bombay HC bench stays Waze’s bail.

The Bombay High Court has temporarily halted the bail granted to dismissed police officer Sachin Waze in the Antilia bomb scare case.  A division bench of Justice Girish Kulkarni and Justice Dr Neela Gokhale stayed  the special court’s order that granted him bail.

 NIA’s Appeal:

The bench passed this  interim order while hearing an appeal  by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which is  challenging the  bail to Waze.

Judges Step Aside:

Earlier, three judges of the Bombay High Court had recused themselves from hearing the NIA’s appeal. After that, the appeal was given to the bench of Justice Kulkarni and Justice Gokhale.

For now, the High Court has stopped the special court’s bail order from taking effect. The matter will be heard again in the first week of October.

The Case:

Waze, a dismissed Mumbai Police officer, is being prosecuted for the Antilia bomb scare case and for the murder of businessman Mansukh Hiran.

The special court had first granted him bail, and the NIA then went to the High Court asking it to step in. The stay will stay in place until the court considers the NIA’s appeal further.


Case Detail: National Investigation Agency (NIA) v. Sachin Hindurao Waze

14 Actions, 2 Dissenting Election Commissioners: Plea Against CEC Gyanesh Kumar Awaits Bombay HC Hearing

On Monday (September 28), the Kolhapur bench of the Bombay High Court declined to grant an urgent hearing to a writ petition. The petition questions 14 actions allegedly taken by Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar. It says this was done even though the other two Election Commissioners, Dr Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Dr Vivek Joshi, reportedly objected.

What the Petition Says:

The petition was filed through Advocate Asim Sarode. It raises concerns about how decisions were allegedly taken on electoral rolls, voter registration, the electoral-roll database and the work of Electoral Registration Officers. It argues that these decisions raise serious questions about following the law and about constitutional governance.

Why the Bench Declined:

The petition was mentioned before a division bench of Justice Sharmila Deshmukh and Justice Neeraj Dhote. The bench did not take it up immediately, saying its roster was too busy.

What It Seeks to Cancel:

The petition asks the court to cancel 14 administrative orders and actions issued by the Election Commission of India (ECI) and Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar over the past ten months. A recent report by The Indian Express said that Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi had objected to these matters.

Objections Raised:

According to the report, the objections covered several issues including:

1) Changes to Form 6, which is used to register new voters

2) Deleting and restoring voter names

3) Appeals against orders that restored voters during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) process

4) How the electoral roll database is handled and who can access it.

Decisions Without Approval:

The report also said Sandhu and Joshi objected to some decisions allegedly being taken without their knowledge or approval. These included what they called “unauthorised and illegal” changes to Form 6, and the gradual centralisation of access to the electoral-roll database.

The two Election Commissioners also reportedly went to the Cabinet Secretary about changes in how work on the IT systems used for electoral rolls was assigned. They alleged these changes were made without their knowledge.

“The instant PIL challenges the manner in which decisions concerning the preparation, revision and maintenance of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of elections in the country have allegedly been prepared and implemented by the ECI, despite recorded objections by Sandhu and Joshi, particularly concerning voter registration, electoral- roll database and the functioning of Electoral Registration Officers,” the plea states.

Demands:

The petitioners want the court to cancel the 14 disputed actions. They also want the names of deleted voters restored.

They argue that the alleged actions amount to a “systematic erosion of constitutional norms” on managing electoral rolls. They say this affects their fundamental right to equal treatment under Article 14 and their constitutional right to vote through adult suffrage under Article 326.

The petitioners have asked for several directions including:

a)Quashing the 14 disputed actions

b)Stopping the SIR process in Maharashtra

c)Restoring deleted voter names

d)Postponing the coming State Assembly Elections until legally compliant electoral rolls are prepared and approved

e)Setting up an independent Judicial Committee to investigate the alleged irregularities.

The plea also argues that while handling electoral rolls, the ECI must take a realistic, pragmatic and flexible approach so that the country continues to be governed democratically.

Next Hearing:

The matter is likely to be taken up on October 22.

Case Details: Prathamesh Govankar & Ors v. Election Commission of India & Ors


“Solidarity Is Not a Solution”: SC Wants Accountability Fixed for Sexual Offences in Delhi-NCR

The Supreme Court on Monday, comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice K Vinod Chandran, took suo motu cognizance of a series of recent rape and sexual assault incidents reported across Delhi-NCR.The cases include the alleged gangrape and murder of a teenage girl in Delhi, and the sexual assault of a minor inside a moving sleeper bus.

Court Calls for Accountability:

The Bench said it was deeply  distressed by  the repeated  reports of such crimes in the National Capital Region. It said  these  incidents raised serious doubts  about how well the police and public safety systems are working. The Court said someone must be held responsible for any failures by institutions that may have led to these crimes.

Two Cases That Shocked the Court:

The court spoke about  the gangrape and murder of a teenage girl in Swarup Nagar, Delhi. Her  decomposed body was subsequently recovered from a field. The Court also took note of the alleged sexual assault of a minor inside a moving sleeper bus. The Bench noted that the bus travelled approximately 47 kilometres from Greater Noida to Delhi without being intercepted by the police, observing that “one cannot help but draw painful parallels to the Nirbhaya incident of 2012.”

Has Anything Changed Since Nirbhaya?

The Court questioned whether the law enforcement and administration have improved in any real way  since the  Nirbhaya incident in 2012. The Bench noted that these incidents could not be viewed in isolation. When looked at along with other recent reports of sexual offences across Delhi-NCR, they point to bigger worries about public safety and how institutions respond.

“A Systematic Failure”

“These incidents considered alongside other recent reports of sexual offences across Delhi-NCR starkly underline a systematic failure on the part of the law enforcement and the public administrative authorities to guarantee basic public safety,” the bench observed.

Right to Live Without Fear:

The Bench also stressed that the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution includes the right to live with dignity and without fear of violence. It said public places such as roads, parks, buses, metro stations, subways and footbridges must not become “zones of high risk”. Such risk can come from poor lighting, too little surveillance, weak patrolling or other administrative failings that could have been prevented.

Concern Alone Is Not Enough:

The Court also criticised the habit of only showing concern or solidarity after such incidents happen. It said the authorities who are responsible for preventing crime, keeping public order and protecting vulnerable people must be judged by clear and measurable standards of responsibility.

“Solidarity Is Not a Solution”

“Expressions of solidarity devoid of accountability fall short of answering the larger institutional question. Expressing solidarity is not a solution to this social evil. What is required is a measurable response with the responsibility and accountability fixed upon authorities entrusted with the prevention of crimes, maintenance of public order and protection of vulnerable persons,” the bench observed.

Suo Motu Case Registered:

Given these larger concerns, the Bench ordered that a suo motu case be registered. The case will look at this issue and at whether the current systems are enough to keep women and children safe in Delhi-NCR.

Supreme Court Crushes Husband’s Bid to Block Wife’s UK Divorce

The Supreme Court comprising Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice N.V. Anjaria held that a court cannot block someone from continuing a case in a foreign court just because it thinks the foreign court might later give a decision that India won’t recognize or enforce. This case was about a divorce dispute involving courts in India and the UK.

Background of the Case

A husband and wife got married in Kolkata in 2018. They later lived together in London for a long time. In 2024, the husband filed for divorce in the Alipore Family Court in India. After that, the wife filed her own divorce and financial case in the UK Family Court, based on the ground that the marriage had broken down beyond repair.

The UK case also dealt with temporary maintenance payments and questions about which country’s court should actually handle the matter.

The husband then went to the Alipore Civil Court asking it to stop his wife from continuing her case in the UK. The trial court agreed and issued an order (without even hearing the wife’s side) blocking her from proceeding in the UK.

The trial court’s reasoning was that “irretrievable breakdown of marriage” isn’t a valid ground for divorce under Indian law, so any UK decision based on it couldn’t be enforced in India anyway. It also worried about two courts handling the same dispute at once.

What the High Court and Supreme Court Said:

The Calcutta High Court cancelled this order, pointing out that the UK Family Court was already looking into the question of which court should handle the case. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court.

The Supreme Court explained that this kind of order, called an “anti-suit injunction,” is a rare and special remedy. As the Court put it: “Anti-suit injunctions are meant to restrain a party to a suit or proceeding from instituting or prosecuting a case in another court, including a foreign court.” These orders are based on fairness principles, not strict law.

How Courts Should Decide on Such Orders:

The Court said that before blocking someone from a foreign case, a court must check:

1) Does it have legal authority over the person it wants to restrict?

2) Would refusing the block actually harm justice?

3) Respect for other countries’ courts (called “comity of courts”)

4) If two courts could hear the case, which one makes more sense given convenience and whether the foreign case is unfair or troublesome

Indian Courts Can’t Control Foreign Courts:

The Court stressed that an Indian court has no power to directly control what a foreign court does. It said: “A court in one sovereign jurisdiction, cannot stay proceedings pending before a court in another sovereign jurisdiction, for the simple reason that courts do not possess appellate or supervisory powers across political boundaries.’’

This Should Not Be a Routine Order:

The Court made clear this kind of block should not be handed out casually. It said: “The grant of anti-suit injunction is not a matter of course,” and added, “The anti-suit injunction orders are not supposed to be a routine judicial exercise.”

It also added :

“the  Courts should be “extremely slow” unless the pure legal or jurisdictional considerations are applicable, to issue the anti-suit injunction and thereby stall the proceedings in a court in the foreign country.”

The Court also referred to an earlier case, Dinesh Singh Thakur v. Sonal Thakur, repeating that: “Before passing the order of anti-suit injunction, courts should be very cautious and careful, and it should be granted sparingly and not as a matter of routine as such orders involve a court impinging on the jurisdiction of another court.”

Why the Husband’s Argument Failed:

The husband argued the UK case should be stopped since “irretrievable breakdown of marriage” isn’t a valid divorce ground under Indian law (the Hindu Marriage Act).

The Supreme Court rejected this, saying you can’t just assume the foreign court is using its power wrongly. Just because a ground doesn’t exist in Indian law doesn’t mean the wife would automatically win her UK case on that basis.

The Court found the original block was issued too early and based on assumptions. It said: “The main proceedings are pending, and all the issues are at large including the jurisdiction of that court.” It further noted: “On the speculative consideration that the suit would be decreed by the UK Family Court on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, anti-suit injunction would not have been granted by the Alipore Trial Court.”

Strong Ties to the UK:

The Court also pointed out that the couple had lived in London for a long time, had their marital home there, and had built their financial life there, meaning the UK case had solid, genuine connections to that country.

The UK Case Wasn’t Even Finished Yet:

Finally, the Court noted that the UK proceedings hadn’t concluded when the block was issued.

It said: “One of the factors, which should dissuade the court from granting anti-suit injunction is that the proceedings before the foreign court which are sought to be interjected, are yet to conclude.”

It added: “No legitimate ground or logical reason would generally arise to stay the proceedings before the foreign court by way of anti-suit injunction, when they are at an inchoate stage and have not culminated into a final decision.”

Final Outcome:

The Supreme Court upheld the Calcutta High Court’s decision and dismissed the husband’s appeal. The Court clarified that both parties are still free to challenge any future or final decisions from the UK Family Court through the proper legal channels.

Case Details: MIHIR PRAKASH BAJORIA VERSUS VIDUSHI JAIN BAJORIA