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The Supreme Court has held that the police can register an FIR even after a Magistrate has rejected an application seeking registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. / Section 175(3) of the BNSS.
A division bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice NV Anjaria held that, “The rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC cannot curtail or extinguish the independent statutory obligation cast upon the Police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC.”,
Case Background:
The bench was hearing an appeal against the Allahabad High Court’s refusal to quash an FIR registered in a cheating case against the Appellant-accused.
Before the High Court, the accused sought for the FIR to be quashed on procedural grounds. He argued that once the Magistrate had rejected the complainant’s application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, the police could not later register an FIR.
The Appellant also argued that the Magistrate had called for a police enquiry report to check whether the complainant’s allegations were true. Therefore, according to the Appellant, the Magistrate had already considered the matter on merits. He claimed that because the Section 156(3) application was rejected, the police should not be allowed to register an FIR later.
Rejecting this argument, Justice Mishra, in the judgment, held that rejection of a complainant’s application under Section 156(3) does not stop the police from later registering an FIR. The Court said that an order under Section 156(3) does not decide whether the allegations are true or false. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata cannot be used to stop the police from later registering an FIR.
The court observed:
“an order passed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC is confined to directing, or declining to direct, the exercise of the statutory power of investigation under Chapter XII of the Code. Such an order neither entails an adjudication on the merits of the allegations nor determines any right or liability of the proposed accused. Applying the same principle, the rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, being an order rendered at the threshold without any adjudication on the merits after trial, cannot be accorded such finality as would attract the doctrine of res judicata so as to bar the subsequent registration of an FIR or the continuation of criminal proceedings founded upon the same or substantially similar allegations.”.
The Court also relied on its 2015 order in Mahendri and Others v. State of U.P. and Another, which dealt with the same issue. The Court noted that the earlier decision had already made it clear that rejection of an application under Section 156(3) does not decide the merits of the case or whether the allegations later made before the police through an FIR are true.
“The above conclusion also receives direct affirmation from the order of this Court in Mahendri and Others v. State of U.P. and Another, where the precise contention urged before this Court was that once an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC had been rejected, it was impermissible for the complainant to subsequently lodge an FIR founded on the same allegations.”
The Court accordingly reiterated that “the Court unequivocally held that rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC neither determines the merits of the controversy nor reflects upon the truthfulness of the allegations subsequently made in the FIR.”
Further, the bench said that Section 154(1) of the Cr.PC / Section 173(1) of the BNSS works independently. Its operation does not depend on the outcome of proceedings under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC / Section 175(3) of the BNSS. The Court observed that holding otherwise would go against the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh.
“Independent of whether an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC has been allowed or rejected, the duty of the Police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC remains governed by the statutory mandate of the Code. The obligation to register and investigate a cognizable offence does not emanate from a direction issued by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) but flows directly from Sections 154 and 156 of the Cr.PC. itself. This position stands authoritatively settled by the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari wherein it was held that where the information furnished discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, registration of an FIR is mandatory,” noted the court.
The Court further explained that at the stage of registration of an FIR, the police do not have to decide whether the allegations are ultimately true or believable. These questions have to be examined during the investigation.
“The police officer cannot avoid that statutory duty and at the stage of registration, the enquiry is confined to whether the information ex facie discloses a cognizable offence, the truthfulness, credibility or otherwise of the allegations being matters for investigation and not for refusing registration.”, the Court observed.
The bench also emphasised that rejecting an application under Section 156(3) does not end the police’s legal duty when later information shows that a cognizable offence has been committed.
“The consequence is self-evident. The rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC cannot curtail or extinguish the independent statutory obligation cast upon the Police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC. If, notwithstanding such rejection, information disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence is subsequently furnished to the Police, the statutory duty recognised in Lalita Kumari (supra) continues to operate with full force.”
While considering the Appellant’s plea for quashing the FIR, the Court also referred to the rules governing the use of its power under Section 482 of the Cr.PC.
Relying on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, the Court said that while considering a plea to quash an FIR, the Court must only see whether the allegations, if taken at face value, show that a cognizable offence was committed. The Court should not at that stage examine whether the allegations are correct or whether the evidence is reliable.
“It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.PC, the Court is concerned only with whether the allegations contained in the FIR, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. At that stage, the Court does not embark upon an enquiry into the correctness, reliability or probative value of the material relied upon by either side. This principle stands authoritatively settled in Bhajan Lal (supra) and has been consistently reaffirmed, in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd (supra).”
Applying this principle to the case, the Court noted that the FIR alleged that the Appellant had induced the informant to pay large amounts of money by claiming that he could get public jobs for the informant’s son and grandson. The allegations further said that the Appellant received the money in his bank account, used forged admit cards and examination results as part of the alleged cheating, and later threatened the informant when the informant asked for the money back.
The Court also noted that the Appellant had been named as an accused in five FIRs containing substantially similar allegations. The Court held that, if the allegations were taken at face value, they showed that cognizable offences had been committed and required investigation.
Res Judicata
The bench also considered whether the doctrine of res judicata could apply in criminal proceedings. It referred to the decision in S.C. Garg and clarified that there was no conflict between the earlier decisions recognising the application of res judicata in criminal proceedings and later decisions such as Devendra and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Muskan Enterprises and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another.
The Court observed:
“The discussion in S.C. Garg (supra) clarifies that there is, in fact, no inconsistency between the earlier authorities recognising the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata in criminal proceedings and the later decisions in Devendra and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Muskan Enterprises and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another.”
The Court explained that cases such as Pritam Singh and Another v. State of Punjab, Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan and State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand Jain involved proceedings where the issue had already reached a final decision.
In contrast, Devendra and Muskan Enterprises involved successive petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.PC, where the merits of the case had not been decided.
Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata could not be applied in the same way to the present procedural situation.
Since the material on record prima facie showed that cognizable offences had been committed, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the Allahabad High Court’s decision allowing the proceedings against the Appellant to continue.
The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Case Details: Pramod Kumar Shukla vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 3931 of 2026)
