Grounds of arrest must be furnished to the arrestee instantaneously upon their arrest stated the Delhi High Court Single Judge-Bench of Justice Anup Jairam Bhambhani on 4th February 2025 so that they get sufficient time to consult with their lawyer. The Court maintained that furnishing grounds of arrest in writing to an arrestee just an hour before the remand hearing cannot be considered acceptable in compliance with the requirements of Section 50 of the CrPC.

The background of this case is that the petitioner Marfing Tamang @ Maaina Tamang, was accused of being the manager of an establishment engaged in sexual abuse and exploitation and allegedly living off the proceeds of such activities. Based on an FIR registered on 17th May, 2024 under sections 342, 344, 365, 368, 370, 370(A), 372, 373, 376, 120B and 34 of the IPC and sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act. The Metropolitan Magistrate at Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, remanded the petitioner to police custody for two days on May 18, 2024, followed by judicial custody for 14 days on May 20, 2024. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner then filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging the 18th May, 2024 order of the Metropolitan Magistrate at Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. The State submitted a status report dated 8th June, 2024 in response.

The petitioner’s advocate argued that the grounds of arrest were not communicated until after the remand application was filed, rendering the arrest and remand illegal. Citing Pranav Kuckreja vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Kshitij Ghildiyal vs. Director General of GST, the advocate contended that the petitioner was not produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours, and the grounds for arrest presented in the remand application differed from those given during the hearing.

References were also made to Ram Kishor Arora vs. Directorate of Enforcement and Prabir Purkayasta vs. State (NCT of Delhi), emphasizing that Section 50 Cr.P.C. requires immediate communication of arrest grounds. The advocate also highlighted that the petitioner was called to the police station at 11:30 a.m. on 17th May, 2024 but was produced before the Magistrate only at 4:00 p.m. on 18th May, 2024, as recorded in the impugned order.

The State argued that "detention" and "arrest" are distinct, asserting that the petitioner, though reached the police station from 11:30 a.m. on 17th May, 2024, but was formally arrested only at 6:30 p.m. after sufficient evidence was obtained, including the victim’s statement. The arrest memo was filed at that time, and the petitioner was produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours as required by law.

Regarding the grounds of arrest, the State contended they were served at 4:40 p.m. on 18th May, 2024, with the petitioner’s advocate acknowledging receipt. The State distinguished this case from Pranav Kuckreja and relied on Ram Kishor Arora vs. Directorate of Enforcement, where "as soon as may be" was interpreted as within a reasonable time. Lastly, the State refuted any discrepancy in the grounds of arrest, arguing there is no legal requirement for the remand application to explicitly include them, making the petitioner’s claims irrelevant.

The Bench after examining the facts and arguments noted that Section 50 Cr.P.C. requires arresting agencies to communicate the grounds of arrest “forthwith” in cases of arrests without warrant, ensuring the arrestee can seek legal recourse against remand.

“There is a reason why the above interpretation of the word “forthwith” is the only interpretation that is in consonance with the constitutional mandate that a person cannot be deprived of his liberty mechanically or needlessly. And the reason is that though a person may be detained for enquiry or interrogation, it is only when an IO forms an opinion that there are some justifiable grounds to arrest a person that he would place the person under arrest.” the Court opined.

The Court conferred that once the investigating officer has determined the reasons for a person's arrest, there is no reason why these grounds cannot be put in writing and shared with the individual at the time of the arrest. It also stated that any other connotation of the word “forthwith” would not only dilute the plain meaning of that word but would also violate the fundamental right to be informed of the reasons for arrest and hinder the arrestee’s ability to seek legal recourse.

Accordingly, the High Court set aside both the remand order and the petitioner’s arrest, citing non-compliance with Section 50 CrPC and Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. The Court directed the petitioner’s immediate release, subject to furnishing a personal bond of ₹25,000 with two local sureties.

Case Details: Marfing Tamang v. State of Delhi CRL.M.C.-4391/2024

Advocate for Petitioner: Mr. Adit S. Pujari and Ms. Shaurya Mittal

Advocate for Respondent: Mr. Utkarsh, APP for the State.