Allahabad HC Sets Aside Afzal Ansari's Conviction, Allows Him to Continue as MP
Landmark Judgement In POCSO Case
The Supreme Court Division Bench comprising Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud and Justice JB Pardiwala gave a landmark judgement and set aside the judgment passed by the Madras High Court to quash criminal proceedings in POCSO case and restored the criminal proceedings in Special Court.
The Appellants in the matter are Child Rights Organization and NGOs working against Child Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation and other allied causes. The Appellants were not a party in the proceedings before the High Court but since the matter involved serious issue of public importance, the Court allowed them to challenge the Impugned Judgement of the Madras High Court.
The Factual matrix is that FIR was registered against the Accused on January 29, 2020 for allegedly being an active consumer of pornographic material involving children. Chargesheet came to be filed on September 19, 2023 under s.67B of IT Act and s.15(1) POCSO which came to be quashed by Madras High Court on January 11, 2024 on the following grounds:
1. Charge as per FIR of s.14(1) would not be attracted since the accused person should have used the child for pornographic purposes. he has not used a child or children for pornographic purposes, at the best, it can only be construed as a “moral decay on the part of the accused person”
2. To constitute offense u/s 67B IT Act, the Accused must have published, transmitted or created material depicting children in sexually explicit act or conduct. The same is not the case.
3. Placed reliance on s.292 IPC and took view that absence of any material to indicate any transmission or publication of pornographic content involving child, no offence could be said to have been committed under the POCSO or the IT Act.
The Ld. Senior Counsel for Appellants submitted that this interpretation of the High Court poses a threat to the well-being of the children and may result in proliferation of child pornography. He also placed reliance on Convention on Cybercrime and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989. He also contended that s.15(1) POCSO was not given due consideration and was not addressed. Also, that the s.67B IT Act was specifically introduced for stringent punishment for collecting, downloading, or watching child pornographic material unlike Adult Pornography u/s 67 & 67A IT Act. He further stated that presumption of existence of Culpable Mental state u/s 30 POCSO was not considered.
Senior Counsel for NCPCR submitted that the State failed to registered the FIR u/s 15(1) and the Prosecuting Agency failed to bring into the Court’s notice that Chargesheet was filed u/s 15(1) POCSO not 14(1). Also, that the Accused failed to take steps u/s 19 POCSO of deleting the pornographic material stored by him for two years. Further contended that s.19 POCSO mandates reporting to Special Juvenile Police Unit and if not done, is punishable u/s 21. So, reporting to an NGO cannot absolve social media platforms of its liability u/s 21. Finally, she submitted that it is imperative to provide children, a safe online environment for educational purposes, as per Art.12 of UNCRC.
Counsel for the Accused submitted that FIR was lodged u/s 14(1) POCSO and 67B IT Act. Thus, no error of law in the Judgement. Receipt of videos recovered were dated before the 2019 amendment of s.15 was in force. Forensic Evidence clearly shows creation and modification date to be the same depicting that the videos were never accessed. Research study shows that “WA” in the name of the videos meant that those were auto-downloaded. Mere possession doesn’t constitute u/s 15(1) as the Accused had no intention to share or distribute them. Also, contended ignorantia juris of s.15 due to government’s failure to publicize the law with bona fide belief. He placed reliance on Chandi Kumar Das Karmarkar v. Abanidhar Roy, AIR 1965 SC 585 and Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409.
Ld. Counsel for State submitted that Impugned order was erroneous as both chargesheet and Quashing Petition mentioned s.15(1) POCSO but that was not considered while indictment. Impugned Order doesn’t give due consideration to s.67B IT Act. Objective of s.15 & s.67B included tackling creation and dissemination of such material by the perpetrators. Impugned Order itself admits that Accused a/w his friends would regularly watch such material. There was presence of more than 100 pornographic videos on the phone of the Accused. Marginal note of s.15 self-explanatory (punishable for storage or possession). Chargesheet prima facie disclosed commission of Offense so quashing of proceedings were not proper.
The Issues Raised and held the following:
I. What is the scope of Section 15 of the POCSO and underlying distinction between sub-section(s) (1), (2) and (3)?
The court observed that Section 15 of the POCSO provides to penalize mere storage or possession of any pornographic material involving a child when done with any particular intention without requiring any actual transmission, dissemination etc. specified under subsection(s) (1), (2) or (3) respectively.
The court, for this issue concluded that Section 15 sub-sections (1), (2), and (3) are distinct offences, distinct from each other due to varying degrees of culpable mens rea required under each provision and that he police and courts must determine if an offense under Section 15 of the POCSO is committed if it does not fall within one specific subsection, and must consider other sub-sections.
II. Whether, mere viewing, possessing or storing of any child pornographic material is punishable under the POCSO?
The court, for this issue, held that the internet viewing, distribution, or display of child pornographic material without physical possession or storage is considered possession under Section 15 of the POCSO, provided the person maintains control over the material by virtue of the doctrine of constructive possession. Child pornography refers to sexually explicit visual depictions of a child that appear to involve a child from the perspective of an ordinary prudent person. Courts must form a prima facie opinion to determine if the material is considered child pornographic under the POCSO.
III. What is the true scope of Section 67B of the IT Act?
The court held that Section 67B of the IT Act penalizes electronic exploitation and abuse of children online, including the dissemination of child pornographic material, creation, possession, propagation, and consumption of such material and that Sections 67, 67A, and 67B of the IT Act should be interpreted purposively to suppress mischief and promote remedy, ensuring legislative intent in penalizing cyber-offences involving children and pornography.
IV. What is the scope of s.30 POCSO and what are the foundational facts necessary for invoking the statutory presumption of culpable mental state in respect of s.15 POCSO?
The court held that the statutory presumption of culpable mental state of the accused as envisaged under Section 30 of the POCSO allows the prosecution to establish the necessary foundational facts for a specific offense against the accused, which can be rebutted by discrediting the prosecution's case or providing evidence.
The Court laid down the foundational facts necessary for the purpose of invoking the statutory presumption of culpable mental state for an offence under Section 15 of POCSO as follows: -
V. Whether, the statutory presumption in s.30 POCSO can be invoked only at the stage of trial by the Special Court alone? In other words, whether it is permissible for the High Court in a quashing petition filed under s.482 CrPC to resort to the statutory presumption of culpable mental state contained in s.30 POCSO?
For this issue, the court held that the statutory presumption of culpable mental under Section 30 of POCSO can be made applicable in a quashing proceeding pertaining to any offence under the POCSO.
Before parting with the Judgement, the Court also added a portion wherein it made a few suggestions to various Departments.
"We further forbid the courts from using the term "child pornography" and instead the term "child sexual exploitative and abuse material" (CSEAM) should be used in judicial orders and judgements of all courts across the country."
The Supreme Court also laid emphasis on Education Programs and observed that:
The court also laid down an obligation to report under Section(s) 19 & 21 respectively of the POCSO and Role of the Society and all Stakeholders.
The Court ruled that social media intermediaries cannot claim exemption from liability under Section 79 of the IT Act for third-party information, data, or communication links unless due diligence is conducted, including reporting child pornographic content and also observed:
"We are also of the view that such due diligence includes not only removal of child pornographic content but also making an immediate report of such content to the concerned police units in the manner specified under the POCSO Act and the Rules thereunder."
The Court also observed that Social media intermediaries are also obligated to report the same to the Special Juvenile Police Unit (SJPU) or the local police as per s.19 POCSO.
The court endorsed the Shankar Kisanrao Khade (Supra), emphasizing the importance of adherence to POCSO provisions and cautioning against leniency u/s 21 POCSO in cases of child abuse or exploitation by observing:
"We further caution the courts to refrain from showing any form of leniency or leeway in offences under Section 21 of the POCSO, particularly to schools/educational institutions, special homes, children’s homes, shelter homes, hostels, remand homes, jails, etc. who failed to discharge their obligation of reporting the commission or the apprehension of commission of any offence or instance of child abuse or exploitation under the POCSO."
Section 21's lesser punishment threshold does not diminish the gravity or severity of the offense, as affirmed in Maroti (supra). The length of punishment is not the sole indicator of an offence's gravity, but rather a combination of factors, particularly considering the international context of the United Nations Convention on Rights of Children.
The Court suggested the following to the Union of India in its Ministry of Women and Child Development:
In finality, the High Court's judgment was deemed an error, leading to the decision to set aside it and restore criminal proceedings to the Sessions Judge's court. The order was also directed to be sent to the Principal Secretary of Law & Justice and Women and Child Development.
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