The Supreme Court has set aside the acquittal and restored the conviction of two accused charged with S.376(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 , and Sections 4 & 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 in a notable ruling.

The bench of Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Satish Chandra was hearing an appeal challenging the judgment of the Patna High Court, which had acquitted the accused on the grounds of inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case and procedural lapses, particularly the improper joinder of charges under Section 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.).

FACTS:

The case originated from an FIR registered in Piro, Bihar, in July 2016. The victim, a minor, was found to be three months pregnant during a medical examination. She disclosed that she had been repeatedly raped by the Respondent No.1 and Respndent No. 2 over several months, commencing shortly after the Holi festival.

The threats of death prevented her from reporting the incidents immediately. After trial, the Special Court convicted the respondents under Section 376(2) of the IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act, sentencing them to rigorous life imprisonment. On appeal, the High Court acquitted the respondents, citing major infirmities in the prosecution's case, including:

• Failure to prove the precise date and time of the incident.

• Lack of conclusive determination of the victim’s age.

• Absence of proof of pregnancy and abortion.

• Improper framing of charges, which incorrectly stated the date of offense as the date of FIR registration.

• Illegal joinder of trial of the two accused under Section 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), which caused prejudice.

At the outset, the judgement begins with the court observing that the struggle for sensitivity towards offences against women, children, and other marginalized groups had passed through various phases of evolution.

It noted that although the end goal was desirable, the journey was not always pleasant. It also emphasized the situation the victims are in, where at one juncture they are confronting a system filled with insensitive stakeholders, while at other times they are caught in conflict with the procedural intricacies of the law.

It further stated that, despite the importance of procedural sanctity, it amounted to a failure of the system as a whole when a culprit, particularly in cases of heinous sexual offences, managed to walk free by entangling the victim in misapplication of procedural rules, without the victim’s knowledge or control.

After considering the submissions of both parties, the Court proceeded to examine the inconsistencies highlighted by the High Court in its judgment, particularly those relating to the victim’s age, the date and time of the alleged incident, proof of pregnancy and abortion.

Determination of the Victim’s Age

The bench observed that the victim’s mother (PW-3) and father (PW-5) consistently stated she was 12 years old. Furthermore, A school transfer certificate recorded the victim’s date of birth as 03.10.2004, making her approximately 12 years old in 2016.

A medical report from 01.07.2016 noted her age as 15. The Court held that while the age in the medical report showed a variation, the consistent oral evidence and official document from the school conclusively established her minority.

Crucially, the court also pointed out that the age of the victim was not challenged during cross-examination of any of the witnesses mentioned above.

The bench accepted the fact that there are slight variations in the age of the victim at the relevant point of time, but given the unrebutted oral and documentary evidence the bench found that the High Court has erred in raising a doubt where none existed, even inter se the parties to the case.

However, the bench clarified that it did not mean to say that in cases involving POCSO Act or Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, 2015, the determination of age is not required but rather emphasized that in rural contexts, minor discrepancies in documents are not uncommon, and the protective intent of the POCSO Act must not be diluted by insisting on "rigid determination" of age where minority is evident.

Proof of Date, Time, Pregnancy, and Abortion

The Supreme Court found the High Court’s conclusions on these aspects were based on an erroneous appreciation of evidence.

Date and Time: The victim, a traumatized child, consistently stated the assaults began after Holi and continued for months. The medical report confirming a 3-4 month pregnancy on 01.07.2016 perfectly corroborated this timeframe. The Court reiterated that a victim’s inability to recall the exact date and time is natural, especially when intimidation causes a delay in reporting.

Pregnancy and Abortion: The Court found "ample documentary and oral evidence" proving these facts, including the medical report (Annexure P-1) confirming pregnancy, testimony of the doctor (PW-7), and a discharge ticket from Sadar Hospital, Ara, related to the abortion. A letter from the Bihar State Legal Services Authority (Annexure P-4) seeking permission for the abortion further cemented the proof.

Further, addressing the High Court’s reliance on defective framing of charges, the Supreme Court observed Section 464 Cr.P.C., which provides that a conviction is not vitiated merely by irregularity in framing charges unless it causes a failure of justice.

The Court found no prejudice caused to the accused, as the timeframe of the offence was consistently known, and the defence had the opportunity to contest all allegations.

Similarly, while the High Court found fault in the joint trial under Section 223 Cr.P.C., the Supreme Court clarified that misjoinder does not automatically vitiate proceedings unless actual prejudice or miscarriage of justice is demonstrated. The Court reiterated principles from Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab (2021 INSC 642), holding that prejudice must be real, not presumed.

Lastly, the bench dealt with the standard of Reasonable doubt where it cautioned against misapplying the principle of "proof beyond reasonable doubt" to mean "any doubt." A reasonable doubt must be a serious, rational doubt that makes the prosecution's case improbable and suggests a probable alternate version. Acquittals based on minor inconsistencies, contradictions, or procedural lapses that cause no prejudice elevate form over substance and erode public confidence in the justice system.

Thus, after due consideration, the court ultimately held that, in view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view that the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside being unsustainable. The view taken by the Trial Court was correct and we find no infirmity in the same. The judgment of the Trial Court stands restored, both on conviction and sentence.”

Case Title: Sushil Kumar Tiwari v Hare Ram Sah & Ors.,3813/2025

Advocate for Petitioner(s): Mr. Daksha Kumar, Adv. Ms. Tanishq Mehta, Adv. Mr. Aftab Ali Khan, AOR Mr. Deepak Kumar, Adv. Ms. Ankita Baluni, Adv. Ms. Sonakshi Monga, Adv.

Advocate for Respondent(s): Mr. Talib Mustafa, Adv. Ms. Raksha Agrawal, Adv. Mr. Lzafeer Ahmad B.F., AOR Mr. Manish Kumar, AOR Mr. Divyansh Mishra, Adv. Mr. Kumar Saurav, Adv.