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The Supreme Court, in a notable observation, clarified the scope of quashing FIRs or charge-sheets under different legal provisions, emphasizing the distinction between actions taken before and after cognisance of an offence.
Justice Dipankar Datta who authored the ruling along with Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, highlighted that while FIRs or charge-sheets can be quashed under Article 226 prior to cognisance, once judicial cognisance is granted, any challenge must be pursued through Section 528 BNSS (S. 482 CrPC), which allows for contesting not only the FIR or charge-sheet but also the cognisance order, assuming proper pleadings and a strong case for quashing are presented.
The Court elucidated, “So long cognisance of the offence is not taken, a writ or order to quash the FIR/charge-sheet could be issued under Article 226; however, once a judicial order of taking cognisance intervenes, the power under Article 226 though not available to be exercised, power under Section 528, BNSS was available to be exercised to quash not only the FIR/charge-sheet but also the order taking cognisance, provided the same is placed on record along with the requisite pleadings to assail the same and a strong case for such quashing is set up.”
The bench overturned a Bombay High Court order that had dismissed a writ petition under Article 226 read with Section 528 BNSS aiming to quash a FIR.
Background :
The High Court had treated the petition as infructuous simply because a charge-sheet was filed during the petition’s pendency. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court misinterpreted an earlier ruling in Neeta Singh v. State of UP (2024), where it was held that judicial orders are not subject to Article 226 jurisdiction, meaning cognisance orders cannot be challenged through writ petitions. Simply put, this means that orders taking cognisance of a case cannot be challenged through writ petitions before the High Court.
However, since the present case invoked Section 528 BNSS as well, the Supreme Court pointed out that the High Court “could have examined the grievance of the petitioner for quashing the FIR together with the charge-sheet following it, as well as the cognisance taking order."
The Court further explained, “since its jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS was also invoked and the relief claimed could have been suitably moulded subject, of course, to the requisite satisfaction of the court that an order of quashing is warranted on facts and in the circumstances. We have no hesitation to hold that the Division Bench did have the jurisdiction to pass such an order as per the ‘Sitting List’.”
This clarified that the High Court's roster bench was competent to entertain petitions for quashing FIRs, charge-sheets, and cognisance orders under both Article 226 and Section 528 BNSS. Unlike Neeta Singh, where only an Article 226 petition was filed after cognisance, this case involved both Article 226 and Section 528 BNSS, thereby empowering the High Court to grant relief.
The Supreme Court remarked, “Therefore, in our considered opinion, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court misread Neeta Singh (supra), inadvertently omitted to notice the factual dissimilarity as indicated above and consequently, misapplied the ratio of such decision to spurn the challenge laid by the petitioner resulting in a failure of justice.”
Consequently, the appeal was disposed of at the admission stage without notice to the Respondents, and the writ petition has been revived to be reconsidered afresh by the roster bench of the Bombay High Court in accordance with the law.
Case Details: PRADNYA PRANJAL KULKARNI VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR
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